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Abstract— Recently, game theory has been proposed as a tool
for cooperative control. Specifically, the interactions of a multi-
agent distributed system are modeled as a non-cooperative game
where agents are self-interested. In this work, we prove that
this approach of non-cooperative control has limitations with
respect to engineering multi-agent systems. In particular, we
prove that it is not possible to design budget balanced agent
utilities that also guarantee that the optimal control is a Nash
equilibrium. However, it is important to realize that game-
theoretic designs are not restricted to the framework of non-
cooperative games. In particular, we demonstrate that these
limitations can be overcome by conditioning each player’s utility
on additional information, i.e., a state. This utility design fits
into the framework of a particular form of stochastic games
termed state-based games and is applicable in many application
domains.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative control problems entail several autonomous
players seeking to collectively accomplish a global objective.
Examples of cooperative control problems are numerous,
e.g., the sensor coverage problem [1], [2], consensus [3],
[4], power control in a wireless network [5], and network
coding [6], [7]. Regardless of the specific application domain,
the central goal is to derive desirable collective behaviors
through the design of local control algorithms.
One approach to cooperative control problems that is
receiving significant attention is game-theoretic control.
Specifically, the approach is to model the interactions of a
multi-agent control system as a non-cooperative game where
agents are “self-interested” [8], [9]. There are wide-ranging
advantages to this form of a distributed architecture including
robustness to failures and environmental disturbances, reduc-
ing communication requirements, improving scalability, etc.
The two major challenges of modeling a multi-agent system
as a non-cooperative game are (i) designing local agent
objective functions, which may very well be in conflict with
one another, and (ii) designing distributed learning dynamics
so that the resulting global behavior is desirable with respect
to the global objective.
This paper focuses on the first challenge: utility design.
Utility design for non-cooperative control of distributed
systems is a delicate task with many competing objectives.
The two primary objectives are
(i) Existence: A utility design should guarantee that a pure
Nash equilibrium exists.
(ii) Efficiency: A utility design should guarantee that all
Nash equilibria are efficient with respect to the global
objective.
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In a non-cooperative setting where players are self-interested,
a (pure) Nash equilibrium represents an individually agree-
able, or stable, allocation. Therefore, the existence of efficient
equilibria for a utility design is of the utmost importance.
There are several additional objectives for utility design that
are desirable in many application domains including:
(iii) Locality of information: A player’s utility should only
depend on local information.
(iv) Tractability: Computing the utility design should be
tractable in games with a large number of players.
(v) Budget balance: In many problems that involve costs,
the cost must be completely absorbed by the players.
To this point, utility design has primarily been approached
in an application-specific manner, e.g., [5], [10]–[12]. For
each application domain, the authors designed a non-
cooperative game and then analyzed the desirability of the
game by focusing on issues such as existence and efficiency
of equilibria, budget balance, computational complexity, and
locality of information. While the notion of desirability has
been fairly consistent, the game-theoretic design has been
strongly tied to the application domain.
Our goal in this paper is to investigate utility design in an
application independent framework. To that end, we focus on
the class of distributed welfare games (DWGs) introduced
in [2]. The DWG class formalizes the notion of a resource
allocation game and can model a wide variety of applications,
e.g., sensor placement, wireless power management, network
formation, routing, and job scheduling. In a DWG, there
exists a set of resources, each with a welfare (or cost)
function that depends only on the subset of players choosing
that resource. A player’s utility is defined as some fraction
of the welfare garnered at each resource the player selected;
hence, a player’s utility is local by definition. In a DWG,
the complete structure of the utilities is determined by how
the global planner chooses to distribute the welfare at each
resource. Based on this structure, one can explicitly study
the impact of a distribution rule on the desirability issues
mentioned above. See Section II for more background on
DWGs.
Recent results have provided a few promising distribution
rules that are inherited from the traditional economic cost
sharing literature [13]. The designs are referred to as the
wonderful life utility [14] and the (weighted) Shapley value
[15]–[17]. These designs are promising because they both (i)
guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in all DWGs
and (ii) guarantee that the Price of Anarchy (PoA) is 1/2
when the welfare functions are submodular [2], which is
common in many resource allocation problems. In addition
to guaranteeing existence and efficiency, both the Shapley
value and the wonderful life utility designs result in potential
games [18] which can be exploited in distributed learning
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Distribution NE Budget Tractable PoS PoA
Rule Exists Balanced
Wonderful life yes no yes 1 1/2
Shapley value yes yes no 1/2 1/2
Priority-based yes yes yes 1 1/2
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTION RULES FOR DISTRIBUTED WELFARE
GAMES WITH SUBMODULAR WELFARE FUNCTIONS.
algorithms, e.g., [19], [20].
However, despite the promise of the two utility designs
described above, there are some fundamental limitations. The
first limitation is that a budget balanced distribution rule
guarantees the existence of an equilibrium for any game
if and only if the distribution rule is conditioned on each
player’s Shapley value, which is intractable [21]. The second
limitation is that many of the desirable properties described
above are in conflict. The summary in Table I highlights
this fact. The wonderful life utility design is tractable and
guarantees a Price of Stability (PoS) of 1, however it is not
budget balanced. On the other hand, the Shapley value utility
design is budget balanced, but is intractable and has a PoS of
1/2. The first contribution of this work is to prove that there is
a fundamental conflict between budget-balance and efficiency
in non-cooperative utility design. Specifically, we prove that
it is impossible for a budget balanced rule to maintain a
price of stability of 1 (Theorem 1). Furthermore, if a budget
balanced rule guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in
all games, then it must have a price of stability less than 1/2
(Theorem 2).
The fundamental restrictions described above seem dam-
aging to the goal of non-cooperative distributed control,
however the main results of this paper illustrate that it is
possible to bypass the limitations by changing the underlying
structure of the game considered. Specifically, while the tools
of non-cooperative game theory are valuable, there is no
reason to be restricted to that setting. The second contribution
of this work is to show that by conditioning utilities on extra
information (state), it is possible to design a budget balanced
distribution rule that is tractable and maintains a price of
stability of 1. The key idea behind this new utility design is to
change the underlying game so that it is a specific form of a
stochastic game [22] termed a state-based game [23]. In this
framework, we design priority-based rules that outperform
both the wonderful life utility and the Shapley value in all
attributes, as highlighted Table I.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Defining distributed welfare games
A Distributed Welfare Game (DWG), introduced in [2],
is a resource allocation game where each player’s utility is
defined as some fraction of the welfare garnered. Specifically,
there exists a set of players N := {1, ..., n} and a finite
set of resources R that are to be shared by the players.
Each player i ∈ N is assigned an action set Ai ⊆ 2R
where 2R denotes the power sets of R; therefore, a player
may have the option of selecting multiple resources. The
set of joint actions is denoted by A := A1 × · · · × An.
For an action profile a = (a1, a2, ..., an) ∈ A, let a−i
denote the profile of player actions other than player i, i.e.,
a−i = (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , an). With this notation, we
will sometimes write a profile a of actions as (ai, a−i).
In a DWG there is a global welfare function W : A → R
that measures the welfare associated with a particular action
profile. We consider separable global welfare functions of
the form
W (a) =
∑
r∈R
W r(ar),
where W r : 2N → R+ is the welfare function for resource
r and ar denotes the subset of players that selected resource
r in the joint allocation a, i.e., ar := {i ∈ N : r ∈ ai}.
Each player is assigned a utility function Ui : A → R that is
equal to some fraction of the welfare garnered. Specifically,
a player’s utility function is of the form
Ui(ai, a−i) =
∑
r∈ai
fr(i, ar), (1)
where {fr(1, ar), ..., fr(n, ar)} defines how the welfare
garnered from resource r is distributed across the players.
We refer to f := {fr(1, ar), ..., fr(n, ar)}r∈R,ar⊆N as
the distribution rule. A distribution rule must satisfy the
following properties: for any player i ∈ N , resource r ∈ R,
and player set ar ⊆ N
(i) fr(i, ar) ≥ 0,
(ii) i /∈ ar ⇒ fr(i, ar) = 0,
(iii)
∑
i f
r(i, ar) ≤W r(ar).
We refer to distribution rules that satisfy (iii) with equality
as budget balanced distribution rules.
The efficacy of a distribution rule is measured by whether
the distribution rule guarantees both the existence and effi-
ciency of a pure Nash equilibrium. An action profile a∗ ∈ A
is called a pure Nash equilibrium if for all players i ∈ N ,
Ui(a∗i , a
∗
−i) = max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a∗−i). (2)
A pure Nash equilibrium represents a scenario for which no
player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate. We call such
an allocation stable. We will henceforth refer to a pure Nash
equilibrium as simply an equilibrium.
We use the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability
(PoS) to measure the efficiency of equilibria [24]. The price
of anarchy gives a lower bound on the global welfare
achieved by any equilibrium while the price of stability gives
a lower bound on the global welfare associated with the best
equilibrium. Specifically, let G denote a set of DWGs. A
game G ∈ G consists of the player set, N , action sets, Ai,
and utility functions Ui. For any particular game G ∈ G let
E(G) denote the set of equilibria, PoA(G) denote the price
of anarchy, and PoS(G) denote the price of stability for the
game G where
PoA(G) := min
ane∈ E(G)
W (ane)
W (aopt) (3)
PoS(G) := max
ane∈ E(G)
W (ane)
W (aopt) , (4)
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where aopt ∈ arg maxa∗∈AW (a∗). We define the price of
anarchy and price of stability for the set of DWGs G as
PoA(G) := inf
G∈G
PoA(G), (5)
PoS(G) := inf
G∈G
PoS(G). (6)
For a more comprehensive review of the game-theoretic
concepts introduced in this section, we refer the readers to
[20], [24]–[26].
B. Prior work on distributed welfare games
Prior work on distributed welfare games has focused on
identifying distribution rules that guarantee desirable proper-
ties. In [2], [27], the authors identify two types of distribution
rules, inherited from the traditional economic cost sharing
literature, that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium ir-
respective of the welfare functions, the number of players, or
each player’s respective action set. The first such distribution
rule is known as the wonderful life utility [14]. The wonderful
life utility distributes the welfare according to each player’s
marginal contribution, i.e.,
fr(i, ar) := W r(ar)−W r(ar \ i). (7)
The wonderful life utility always guarantees that the alloca-
tion which maximizes the global welfare W is an equilib-
rium; hence, the price of stability is 1 when utilizing such
a design. However, the wonderful life utility provides no
guarantees on the amount of welfare distributed.
The second such distribution rule is known as the Shapley
value [15]–[17]. This rule distributes the welfare according
to each player’s Shapley value, i.e.,
fr(i, ar) :=
∑
S⊆ar:S\i
ωS (W r(S) ∪ {i} −W r(S)) . (8)
where the weight of the player set S is defined as
ωS :=
|S|!(|ar| − |S| − 1)!
|ar|! .
The Shapley value is a budget balanced distribution rule that
always guarantees the existence of an equilibrium. However,
the allocation that maximizes the global welfare is not
guaranteed to be an equilibrium. Furthermore, computing a
Shapley value is intractable for games with a large number
of players.
Table I compares the properties of the wonderful life utility
and the Shapley value and highlights a tension between de-
veloping distribution rules that are budget balanced, tractable
and guarantee a price of stability of 1. Note that the price
of stability is a particularly important measure of efficiency
due to the existence of distributed learning algorithms that
guarantee convergence to the best equilibrium, e.g., [28]–
[30].
Note that many of the results in [2] focus on the special
case where the welfare functions considered belong to an
important class of welfare functions called submodular.
Specifically, a welfare function W r : 2N → R is submodular
if
W r(X) +W r(Y ) ≥W r(X ∩ Y ) +W r(X ∪ Y )
for all X,Y ⊆ N . Submodularity corresponds to the notion
of decreasing marginal contribution and is a very commonly
observed property across resource allocation problems, e.g.,
[31], [32]. In the context of submodular games, it was shown
in [2] that the price of anarchy of the wonderful life and
Shapley value distribution rules is 1/2. In this paper, we will
also often focus on submodular DWGs.
III. LIMITATIONS OF NON-COOPERATIVE DESIGNS
We are now ready to explore the feasibility of deriving
desirable distribution rules for distributed welfare games. We
will focus on the case of submodular DWGs and prove two
theorems illustrating the impossibility of achieving all of the
desirable properties mentioned thus far.
Our first result is that no budget balanced distribution rule
can guarantee a price of stability of 1 in all DWGs with
submodular welfare functions.
Theorem 1: Consider the set of distributed welfare games
with submodular welfare functions and a budget balanced
distribution rule. The price of stability is strictly less than 1.
Proof: Consider a DWG with players set N = {1, 2},
a budget balanced distribution rule f , and a single resource
r with a welfare function of the form
W r(ar) = 1⇔ ar 6= ∅.
If any player is at the resource r, then the entire welfare
of 1 is garnered. Consider the allocation in which both
players select r. The utility garnered to player i ∈ N for
this allocation is fr(i,N). Without loss of generalities, let
fr(1, N) ≥ fr(2, N). Note that fr(1, N) ≥ 1/2.
Suppose player 1 has an option of selecting an alternative
resource r1 that is only available to player 1, i.e, A1 =
{r, r1} and A2 = {r}. Resource r1 has a welfare function
W r1 of the form
W r1(ar1) = fr(1, {1, 2})− ⇔ ar1 6= ∅,
for some  > 0. Since f is a budget balanced distribution
rule, it is easy to show that the profile ane = (r, r) is the
unique equilibrium for any  > 0. The optimal allocation is
the profile aopt = (r1, r) which garners a total welfare of
W (aopt) = 1 + fr(1, N)− ,
≥ 3
2
− .
Therefore, since n are  are arbitrary, this gives us a price
of stability of 2/3 < 1.
The example in the proof of Theorem 1 proves it is
impossible to guarantee a price of stability greater than 2/3
using a budget balance distribution rule. Next, note that in
order for a budget balanced distribution rule to guarantee the
existence of an equilibrium it must be monotonic [21]. 1
Definition 1 (Monotonic): A distribution rule f is mono-
tonic if for any player sets X ⊆ Y ⊆ N and resource r ∈ R
1In [21], the authors show that any budget balanced distribution rule that
guarantees the existence of an equilibrium must be a (weighted) Shapley
value, which is intractable to compute for nontrivial weights. This result
was proven in the context of network formation games, but can be shown
to hold for DWGs using a parallel proof that is omitted due to lack of space.
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such that W r(X) = W r(Y ), then the fraction of welfare
distributed to any player i ∈ X satisfies fr(i,X) ≥ fr(i, Y ).
If a distribution rule is monotonic, then the price of stability
is at most 1/2 over all submodular DWGs.
Theorem 2: Consider the set of distributed welfare games
with submodular welfare functions and a budget balanced
distribution rule that guarantees the existence of an equilib-
rium in all games. The price of stability is ≤ 1/2.
Proof: The proof uses an extension of the proof of
Theorem 1 and relies on the fact that if a distribution
rule is budget balanced and guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium in any game then it must be monotone. Consider
a DWG with player set N = {1, ..., n}, a monotonic
distribution rule f , and a single resource r with a welfare
function of the form
W r(ar) = 1⇔ ar 6= ∅.
If any player is at the resource r, then the entire welfare of
1 is garnered. Consider the allocation in which all players
select r. The utility garnered to player i for this allocation
is fr(i,N). Without loss of generalities, let fr(1, N) ≥
fr(2, N) ≥ ... ≥ fr(n,N). Note that fr(n,N) ≤ 1/n.
Suppose each player i ∈ {1, ..., n − 1} has an option of
selecting an alternative resource ri that is only available to
that particular player, i.e, Ai = {r, ri} for all players i ∈
{1, ..., n−1} and An = {r}. Each resource ri has a welfare
function W ri of the form
W ri(ari) = fr(i,N)− ⇔ ari 6= ∅,
for some  > 0. Since f is monotonic, it is easy to show
that the profile ane = (r, ..., r) is the unique equilibrium
for any  > 0. The optimal allocation is the profile aopt =
(r1, r2, ..., rn−1, r) which garners a total welfare of
W (aopt) = 1 +
n−1∑
i=1
(fr(i,N)− ),
≥ 2n− 1
n
− (n− 1).
Therefore
lim
→0
W (ane)
W (aopt)
≤ n
2n− 1 .
Since n is arbitrary, this gives us a price of stability of 1/2.
IV. STATE-BASED NON-COOPERATIVE DESIGNS
The framework of non-cooperative distributed control pro-
vides a promising paradigm for resource allocation; how-
ever, the preceding section demonstrates two fundamental
limitations. In general, designing local utility functions that
are budget balanced and guarantee the existence of an
equilibrium requires computing a Shapley value for each
player, which is often computationally intractable. Further,
it is impossible for a budget balanced distribution rule to
guarantee a price of stability greater than 1/2. In this section
we seek to overcome these limitations by conditioning a
player’s utility on additional information.
In many settings, players’ utility functions are directly
influenced by an exogenous state variable. In this section,
we consider the framework of state-based games introduced
in [23] which generalizes the non-cooperative game setting to
such an environment. state-based games are a simplification
of the class of stochastic games [22]. In a state-based game,
there exists a finite state space X . Each player i ∈ N
has an action set Ai and a state dependent utility function
Ui : A × X → R. The state evolves according to a state-
transition function P : A×X → ∆(X) where ∆(X) denotes
the set of probability distributions over the finite state space
X .
A state-based game evolves as follows. Let the state at
time t ∈ {0, 1, ...} be denoted by x(t) ∈ X . At any time t,
each player i selects an action ai(t) ∈ Ai randomly based on
available information. The state x(t) and the action profile
a(t) := (a1(t), ..., an(t)) together determine each player’s
utility Ui(a(t), x(t)) at time t. Each player selects an action
ai(t) simultaneously seeking to maximize his one-stage
expected utility E[Ui(a(t), x(t))], where the expectation is
over player i’s belief regarding the action choice of the
other players, i.e., a−i(t). In this case, a player’s strategy
is unaffected by how his current action impacts the state
dynamics and potential future rewards. After each player
selects his respective action, the ensuing state x(t + 1) is
chosen randomly according to the probability distribution
P (a(t), x(t)) ∈ ∆(X). In this paper, we restrict our attention
to state dynamics that satisfy
a(t) = a(t− 1) ⇒ x(t+ 1) = x(t). (9)
This paper focuses on analyzing equilibrium behavior in
such games. We consider state-based Nash equilibria, which
generalize pure Nash equilibria to this state-based setting
[23].
Definition 2 (State-based Nash Equilibrium): The action
state pair [a∗, x∗] is a state-based Nash equilibrium if for
every player i ∈ N and every state x′ in the support of
P (a∗, x∗)
Ui(a∗i , a
∗
−i, x
′) = max
ai∈Ai
Ui(ai, a∗−i, x
′).
If [a∗, x∗] is a state-based Nash equilibrium, then no player
i ∈ N will have a unilateral incentive to deviate from
a∗i provided that all other players play a
∗
−i regardless of
the state that emerges according to the transition function
P (a∗, x∗). We use the term equilibrium to mean state-based
Nash equilibrium in the discussion that follows.
Given a state-based game, an equilibrium may or may
not exist. We consider a simplified framework of state-based
potential games, introduced in [23], for which an equilibrium
is guaranteed to exist. State-based potential games generalize
potential games [18] to the state-based setting.
Definition 3 (State-based Potential Games): A state-
based game with state transition function P is a state-based
potential game if there exists a potential function φ : A → R
such that for any action state pair [a, x] ∈ A × X , player
i ∈ N , and action a′i ∈ Ai
Ui(a′i, a−i, x)− Ui(a, x) > 0⇒ φ(a′i, a−i)− φ(a) > 0.
This condition states that players’ utility functions are
aligned with the potential function irrespective of the state.
To see that an equilibrium exists in any state-based poten-
tial game, let [a∗, x∗] be any action state pair such that
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a∗ ∈ arg maxa∈A φ(a). The action state pair [a∗, x∗] is an
equilibrium. We measure the efficiency of an equilibrium by
extending the measures of the price of anarchy and price of
stability to the state-based setting in the usual way.
V. A PRIORITY-BASED DISTRIBUTION RULE
Moving from traditional non-cooperative designs to state-
based designs gives an additional degree of freedom when
designing distribution rules. The extra degree of freedom is
enough to address the limitations we identified in Section III.
In particular, in this section we provide the design of a state-
based distribution rule that guarantees the existence of an
equilibrium, maintains a price of stability of 1, is tractable,
and is budget balanced.
Before discussing the details of the distribution rule, we
provide a brief sketch of the main idea. Suppose at each
resource there is an ordering, or priority, for the players
utilizing that resource. We condition our distribution rule on
this priority in the following way: players are placed one
by one at the resource in order of their priority and the
welfare distributed to a particular player is set as the player’s
marginal contribution when the player joined the resource.
Therefore, players with lower priority have no impact on
the player’s received welfare. Utilizing the framework of
state-based game to facilitate this distribution rule requires
defining a state space that reflects this notion of priority
and defining a state transition function that specifies how
the priorities are affected by changes in strategies.
Now, we can more formally introduce the state-based
distribution rule. Let X be defined as a set of states that
identifies priorities at all resources. For a given allocation
a ∈ A, define the set of admissible states as X(a) ⊂ X
where X(a) is nonempty and a state x ∈ X(a) defines for
each resource r ∈ R an order of priority for the players
that selected that resource in the allocation a. The order of
priority for each resource r ∈ R is described by a queue
denoted by xr where xri designates the priority of player i
at resource r. Any state x ∈ X(a) satisfies the following
properties for all players i ∈ N and resources r ∈ R: (i) if
r /∈ ai, then xri = ∅, (ii) if r ∈ ai, then xri ∈ {1, ..., |ar|}
where |ar| is the number of players using resource r, and (iii)
xri 6= xrj for any players i, j ∈ ar. We adopt the convention
that xri = 1 indicates that player i has the top priority at
resource r. If xri < x
r
j , we say that i has higher priority than
j at resource r.
We now define the state transition function. Let a(t − 1)
and x(t) be the action profile and state at time t−1 and t. If
one player changes his action, i.e., a(t) = (a′i, a−i(t−1)) for
some player i, the state evolves deterministically according
to the following rules:
(i) If player i leaves resource r, i.e., r ∈ ai(t− 1) but r /∈
ai(t), then each player in the queue behind him moves
forward one spot in the queue, i.e., xrj(t) < x
r
i (t) ⇒
xrj(t + 1) = x
r
j(t) and x
r
j(t) > x
r
i (t) ⇒ xrj(t + 1) =
xrj(t)− 1.
(ii) If player i joins resource r, i.e., r /∈ ai but r ∈ a′i,
then player i has the lowest priority at resource r, i.e.,
xrj(t+1) = x
r
j(t) for all j 6= i and xri (t+1) = |ar|+1.
(iii) Otherwise the priority of players at resource r is un-
changed.
If multiple players seek to join a resource simultaneously,
the order of the entering players is randomly chosen. Note
that x(t+ 1) ∈ X(a(t)). The state dynamics satisfy (9). We
refer to these state dynamics as first in first out (FIFO).
Before explicitly defining each player’s state dependent
utility function we introduce some notation. Let
x¯ri := {j ∈ N : xrj ≤ xri }
represent the set or players at resource r that have a higher
priority than player i given the state x. For any admissible
action state pair [a, x] ∈ A ×X(a), the welfare distributed
to player i, defined as Vi : A×X(a)→ R, is precisely
Vi(a, x) =
∑
r∈ai
(
W r(x¯ri )−W r(x¯ri \ i)
)
(10)
For any admissible action state pair [a, x] ∈ A ×X(a), the
utility of player i for any action a′ ∈ A is defined as
Ui(a′, x) = EP (a′,x)Vi(a′, x′), (11)
where the expectation is with regard to the ensuing state x′
which is chosen randomly according to the measure P (a′, x).
Note that if a′ = (a′i, a−i), the state transition is determin-
istic and the expectation can be dropped. It is important
to highlight two important features of this utility design.
First, this design satisfies properties (i)-(iii) of distribution
for DWGs and is also budget balanced. Secondly, this design
is tractable. Each player only needs to calculate his marginal
contribution to a particular player set. We call this form of
a distribution rule priority-based.
Theorem 3: Consider any distributed welfare game with
submodular welfare functions, priority-based utility functions
as in (11), and FIFO state dynamics. The resulting game is
a state-based potential game with potential function W and
a price of stability of 1.
Proof: Let [a, x] ∈ A×X(a) be any admissible action
state pair. Since our welfare function is submodular, we have
that for any player i and resource r
W r(x¯ri )−W r(x¯ri \ i) ≥W r(ar)−W r(ar \ i).
Therefore, a player’s utility is greater than or equal to his
marginal contribution to the global welfare, i.e.,
Ui(a, x) = Vi(a, x),
=
∑
r∈ai
(
W r(x¯ri )−W r(x¯ri \ i)
)
,
≥
∑
r∈ai
W r(ar)−W r(ar \ i)
= W (a)−W (∅, a−i).
Suppose Ui(a′i, a−i, x) > Ui(a, x) for some a
′
i ∈ Ai. Let
a′ := (a′i, a−i). We can bound the utility difference as
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Ui(a
′, x)− Ui(a, x)
=
∑
r∈a′i\ai
(
W r(ar ∪ i)−W r(ar))−∑
r∈ai\a′i
(
W r(x¯ri )−W r(x¯ri \ i)
)
≤
∑
r∈a′i\ai
(
W r(ar ∪ i)−W r(ar))−∑
r∈ai\a′i
(
W r(ar)−W r(ar \ i))
= W (a′)−W (a).
This implies that
Ui(a′, x)− Ui(a, x) > 0 ⇒W (a′)−W (a) > 0.
Finally, since the potential function of the game is W , it is
clear that any allocation that maximizes W is an equilibrium.
Thus, the price of stability is 1.
In addition to the above theorem, it is straightforward to
verify that the priority-based distribution rule satisfies the
conditions for a utility game set forth in [31]; therefore,
for submodular welfare functions the priority-based design
results in price of anarchy greater than or equal to 1/2. A
comparison between the wonderful life utility, the Shapley
value, and the priority-based design is given in Table I.
The priority-based distribution rule achieves the desirable
properties of both the wonderful life utility and the Shapley
value in a computationally tractable fashion.
It is worth noting that the priority-based distribution rule
can be utilized even in situations where the welfare functions
are not submodular; however, the state dynamics (FIFO) will
potentially have to change to provide similar guarantees.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper focuses on how to design utility functions for
multi-agent systems when the interactions are modeled as
a non-cooperative game. The results in the paper highlight
that there are fundamental limitations of utility design in
the non-cooperative framework and present a promising new
direction for utility design in non-cooperative control. In
particular, the state-based utility design presented here is
only one possible alternative, and a deeper study of the
space of state-based utilities is clearly warranted. Further,
this paper focuses entirely on the question of utility design.
Another important question is how to design distributed
learning algorithms that will converge to an equilibrium. This
question has only begun to be addressed in the context of
state-based games [23].
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